



American Red Cross Ship About to Sail for the European War Zone, with 150 Nurses and 40 Doctors. Copyright by Underwood & Underwood.

FIFTEEN billion human lives, a sum total far too great to be grasped by any human imagination, have been lost in war since the beginning of authentic history. If the exhaustive researches made by Benjamin F. Trueblood, LL. D., an authority, are to be accepted...

Thus battle has cost the world a number of people greater than that of all those who have inhabited the globe during the last six centuries, allowing three generations to the century and accepting the estimate of 650,000,000 for the world's population at the beginning of the nineteenth century as the average population per generation for the six centuries.

But perhaps this statement is too general and complicated of computation to be impressive to the average mind, so it may be better to turn to definite consideration of the nineteenth century.

War during this period, according to a very conservative estimate, cost the lives of 14,000,000 men through wounds and disease, 6,000,000 being sacrificed in the Napoleonic campaigns alone, in the nineteen years between 1796 and 1815.

The war of 1812-14 between England and the United States resulted in the death of about 50,000 men.

Even Little Wars Costly.

The war of 1846-48 between the United States and Mexico cost an other 50,000 lives, most of the American deaths being from disease.

The Crimean war of 1854-56 cost the five nations involved—France, England, Piedmont, Turkey, and Russia—785,000 men, 600,000 of whom died from sickness and hardship.

Little Schleswig-Holstein's comparatively unimportant war, in 1864, cost Denmark, Russia, and Austria 3,500 men.

The American civil war, 1864-65, cost the United States between 800,000 and 1,000,000 lives from wounds and disease, or to strike an average between the two estimates, 900,000 lives.

The short war between Prussia, Austria, and Italy, in 1866, cost 45,000 lives.

European expeditions to Mexico, Morocco, Cochín-China, Lebanon, Paraguay, &c., between 1861 and 1867, cost 65,000 lives.

The Franco-Prussian war, 1870-71, cost more than 225,000 lives.

The Russo-Turkish war of 1871 cost not less than 250,000 lives.

The Zulu and Afghan wars, in 1879, cost 40,000 lives.

The Japo-Chinese War of 1894-95, according to crude and surely incomplete estimates, cost 15,000 lives.

The English-Boer War in South Africa, 1899-1901, cost the lives of 125,000 men, of whom 100,000 were English, and it involved an additional loss of something like 15,000 Boer women and children.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 cost both sides from wounds and disease less than 6,000 lives, but the Philippine aftermath of this war has cost the United States the loss of about 5,000 soldiers and the loss among the native Filipinos, from wounds and disease, during the entire period of definite war and occasional

fighting has amounted, it is said, to 500,000.

The cost of war in money runs even further beyond the limitations of human comprehension.

The Napoleonic wars cost France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Turkey, all of whom were involved, in actual expenditure and destruction, not counting loss of trade and other economic waste, not less than \$15,000,000,000.

The British-American war, 1812-14, cost \$300,000,000.

The United States-Mexican war, 1846-48, cost \$180,000,000.

The Crimean war, 1854-56, cost \$1,660,000,000.

The Italian war, of 1859, cost \$294,000,000.

The Schleswig-Holstein war, of 1864, cost \$150,000,000.

The American civil war, of 1861-5, cost \$8,000,000,000.

The Prussian-Austrian war, of 1866, cost \$325,000,000.

The expeditions to Mexico, Morocco, Cochín-China, &c., 1861-7, cost \$200,000,000.

The Franco-Prussian war, 1870-1, cost \$3,000,000,000.

The Russo-Turkish war, of 1877, cost \$1,100,000,000.

The Zulu and Afghan war, of 1879, cost \$160,000,000.

The China-Japan war, of 1894-5, cost \$60,000,000.

The British-Boer war, of 1899-1901, cost \$1,300,000,000.

The Spanish-American-Philippines war, of 1898 to 1902, cost Spain and the Philippines \$100,000,000, and the United States (Edward Atkinson's estimate for the whole five years) \$700,000,000, or a total of \$800,000,000.

The Russo-Japanese war, 1904-5, cost \$1,735,000,000, of which Japan's share was \$800,000,000.

The grand total of this vast expenditure, about \$33,000,000,000, and the cost of innumerable little wars, of which England alone had eighty during the past century, and of which, for another example, there have been an uncounted number in South and Central America, as well as in the foreign possessions of the various European nations, (as for example, England's India,) would surely add something close to five billions to this total, giving an approximate total cost of \$38,000,000,000, which, for purposes of convenience and with no fear that we really are exaggerating, we may make \$40,000,000,000.

Cost of Great Wars.

But to juggle with such figures in an attempt to estimate what it has cost so many nations of the world to kill so many of their neighbors is a cumbersome task, so we will reduce our observation to the cost of and the total of lives lost during the great comparatively modern wars, beginning not further back than the Napoleonic campaigns, including in the list only the Napoleonic wars, the United States-British war of 1812, the United States-Mexican war of 1846, the Crimean War of 1854, the American civil war, the Franco-Prussian war, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, the Boer-British war, the Spanish-American war, and the Russo-Japanese war.

Taking these alone, and with the certainty that most of the estimated

Fifteen Billion Human Lives Have Been Sacrificed in War Since the Beginning of Authentic History, and Comparatively Recent Wars Have Cost Nearly \$40,000,000,000.

are under rather than over stated, but letting the universality of this offset all errors and give us an average in which we may have some faith, we are confronted by a list of ten campaigns, in which 8,996,000 soldiers lost their lives through wounds or disease, and which cost the combatant nations \$33,081,000,000. This suggests a neat arithmetical conclusion. It is this: It costs more than \$3,677 to kill one man in warfare.

Terrible Losses in This War.

The cost of killing every man who falls in the present European struggle will be much greater than that, in all human probability, for, with the development of fighting, armament has become more elaborate and expensive as methods of defense have become more efficient and costly. Each addition to the cost of either increases the cost of individual slaughter. The table upon which the previous cost of death is based follows:

War	No. Killed	Cost
Napoleonic	6,000,000	\$15,000,000,000
U. S.-Brit. 1812	50,000	300,000,000
U. S.-Mex. 1846	50,000	180,000,000
Crimean, 1854	735,000	1,660,000,000
American Civil	900,000	8,000,000,000
Franco-Prus. 1871	225,000	3,000,000,000
Russo-Turk. 1877	250,000	1,100,000,000
Brit.-Boer, 1899	190,000	1,300,000,000
Span.-Am., 1898	6,000	800,000,000
Russo-Jap., 1904	550,000	1,735,000,000
Total	8,996,000	\$33,081,000,000

Now, the actual cost of killing a man in warfare is really but a small portion of the real expense in money of conducting, enduring, and recovering from war.

The destruction of property which accompanies warfare invariably is enormous, and the sum total of its amount cannot be included in any possibly accurate estimate of a war's cost, for obvious reasons.

Principal among these is the fact that there is absolutely no manner by means of which it can be determined.

Consider the march of the Germans through Belgium and compare it with the march of Gen. Sherman's army to the sea. The Sherman march was principally through farming country containing few important centres of population, and offering, therefore, really very slight opportunities, or necessities for the destruction of property.

Yet Gen. Sherman himself estimated that property conservatively valued at \$300,000,000 was destroyed in the course of this one military movement.

Therefore, should we include losses from property destruction in the great totals upon which we have based the previously given cost of killing a man during the civil war in the United States, we should add, by means of this one item, \$333+ to the expense of every victim of our entire civil war.

And while Sherman's march may have been so far as property worth the most destructive single military

movement which that great struggle knew, its expensiveness would shrink into insignificance if we had at hand, with which to compare it, accurate figures of the total value of the property destroyed elsewhere and in other manner during the whole course of the war.

Not one of the civil war campaigns was conducted in a region approximating in the value of its material property that of the section throughout which the present European war is raging.

Most of it was fought in country comparatively sparsely settled, and in the sixties in the United States not any one square mile of urban territory bore destructible improvements in value approximating the present-day average value represented by any urban square mile in Europe, particularly in Belgium, and in the rural districts in the United States destructible property values averaged lower than they average anywhere in Europe today, and probably did not amount to one-fiftieth as much as they did in that portion of rural Belgium which was ravaged. Certain rural parts of France which were later wrecked would assess almost as high, but never quite as high, as the Belgian rural districts.

It seems unlikely that railroad destruction will play any important part in the final cost of the present war, for all parties concerned value railroads too highly to make such destruction probable.

Wanton destruction of private property by the contending forces in time of war is forbidden, theoretically, on land, but during the South African campaigns of the British Army there were many "burnings" of farms; in our own Philippine campaigns the destruction of property was large, owing to the necessity of razing villages in order to drive out the "snipers"; and what the eventual sum total of the property destroyed during the present European struggle may amount to has not been more than hinted at in the more or less complete destruction of the wonderfully rich Belgian city of Louvain—a destruction which never can be repaired, for Louvain's value had been cumulative through the centuries—she was literally priceless.

Paris Hard Hit.

The voluntary sacrifice by the French of property in the environs of Paris, razed so that it might not obstruct the play of the defending artillery, might very well indicate, in that comparatively tiny area, a total monetary loss much greater than that resulting from Sherman's famous march.

No strictly modern war, until the beginning of the one now in progress, has offered much opportunity for this sort of waste. The Russo-Japanese war was fought in territory comparatively free of high property values, as was the British South African campaign. Our Spanish war signified nothing important of this sort; the Balkan war has involved peoples possessed of slight property values, and has been largely carried on in mountain fastnesses and infertile valleys.

But it seems to be a peculiarity of this war that it will be fought out in those places where it can cost humanity most in material, and aesthetic values, as well as by such methods as will make its tax of human life unprecedentedly, staggeringly heavy.

Prof. Rickett's Figures.

To endeavor to make any estimate, whatever, of the industrial and general economic losses certain to result from the present war, would be a foolish assumption of the right to prophesy, but it is not beyond the province of an investigative mind to consider certain vast losses which must occur.

Prof. Charles Rickett, in Dr. David Starr Jordan's recent book "War and Waste" thus tabulated the expenses of the then proposed general war:

NUMBER OF MEN LIKELY TO BE ENGAGED.	
Austria	2,500,000
England	1,500,000
France	2,400,000
Germany	3,500,000
Italy	2,800,000
Rumania	300,000
Russia	7,000,000
Total	21,500,000

  

DAILY COST OF A GREAT EUROPEAN WAR.	
Feed of men	\$12,000,000
Feed of horses	1,000,000
Pay (European rates)	2,500,000
Pay of workmen in arsenals and ports	1,000,000
Transportation	2,100,000
Transportation of provisions	4,200,000
Munitions—infantry, 10 cart-rifles a day	4,200,000
Artillery—10 shots per day	1,200,000
Marine—2 shots per day	400,000
Equipment	4,200,000
Ambulances—500,000 wounded or ill (\$1 per day)	500,000
Armature	500,000
Reduction of imports	5,000,000
Help to the poor (20 cents per day to one in ten)	6,800,000
Destruction of towns, &c.	2,000,000
Total per day	\$49,800,000

In applying these estimates to the general European war which now actually does exist, but a few changes need be made. The total actual cost will not run far below the estimated cost of close to \$50,000,000. Indeed, it may far surpass it.

The principle loss undoubtedly will arise from the withdrawal of men from industry.

The existence of large standing armies in all the nations engaged will make this relatively smaller, considered from one point of view, than would be occasioned by a war in this country involving a similar number of men, but, indirectly considered, the very existence of these standing armies, which have been a fixed charge upon the people, has been one of the things leading up to this war, and, therefore, it might be fair to charge up the total cost of armament and withdrawal of labor from in-

dustry for military service during the preceding years of peace to the struggle which now is in progress.

It would be by no means difficult to gather these figures for presentation here, but it would be waste of time, for they would have picturesque value only.

For many years European expenditure for armament has exceeded a billion dollars annually. No human mind can think a billion dollars. It is too great a value for the brain to grasp.

To detail and then total the cost of French and German armies during the peace years, to count up Great Britain's naval and military charges since the end of the South African campaign, and, backward, between that and Waterloo, would be merely to place upon paper a series of figures. For they would mean so much that to a normal mind they would mean nothing.

And if the cost of this great war may be reckoned as having extended back through all the years of preparation, so it may be reckoned as certain to extend forward through many years of recuperation. The major portion of the ultimate cost of the existing war will be borne by coming generations, resting as a mighty burden upon men and women yet unborn.

Commercial disorganization is another item which defies the statistician. Who shall say, for instance, what Germany's loss already has been through the banishment or her commercial shipping from the seas? It surely has exceeded by far the value of the vessels she has lost, and, before the war is over, it will exceed, in all human probability, the value of every ton of shipping flying Germany's flag.

Losses suffered by commercial businesses on land will aggregate a far greater, and, therefore, more inconceivable sum, which even more completely defies prophecy, and, as the United States has learned, such loss, in these days, by no means is confined to the warring nations, but is spread, not thinly, over the entire surface of the civilized earth.

Whole World Upset.

Financial disarrangement is now universal, as the result of the great war, and is eating values with appalling greediness. The world's pocketbook is the centre of its nervous system and this war, recorded as it is not only by ocean telegraph which flashes instantaneous messages to all parts of the world, but by transatlantic wireless, has upset it as nothing ever has before.

Nor does this business, commercial, and financial loss comprise the total of the inevitable dreary aftermath of waste. Our civil war ended forty-five years ago, yet we are still paying civil war bills.

We have spent far more than \$8,000,000,000 on our pension list, and it will cost us another two billions before we have finished with it—more than half as much as North and South together spent upon the actual war.

The greater portion of the public debt of the United States is war debt, and since the civil war this has cost the Government in interest charges two and a half billions, with interest still running on three-quarters of a

billion and more. The State expenditures for bounties and other expenditures directly traceable to the civil war have totaled more than \$800,000,000.

The after-cost of European war has been and will be proportionately less than ours, for they pension far less liberally than we do, but an approximate guess at the price they have been and still are paying for past wars may be formed by a glance at their public debt interest figures, for their public debts are principally war debts.

Before the beginning of the present war the French debt was approximately six billion dollars, demanding interest payments of over two hundred million dollars a year.

Interest Payments on Wars.

Thus, says Benjamin Trueblood, "In the thirty-five years since the Franco-Prussian war, which cost France, including her one billion dollars indemnity to Germany, not less than three billion dollars, she will have paid out, in interest alone, a sum from two to three times the original cost of that war, or, reckoning the interest on only three billion dollars, a sum fully equal to the cost of the war."

The total war debt of Europe at the beginning of the present war aggregated over thirty billion dollars. Thus interest charges of more than a billion a year have aggregated more than thirty-five billion dollars since the ending of the wars which so terribly afflicted the third quarter of the last century.

For definite examples, the Boer war increased Great Britain's public debt by eight hundred millions, and the Russo-Japanese war increased the debts of the two nations involved by a billion and a half.

So these two wars, neither of them comparable to the struggle which now seethes throughout all Europe, imposed upon this trio of nations an interest charge to run on indefinitely at fully sixty millions a year.

The European armaments which were maintained in preparation for the war which now progresses, and which, in the minds of many, are responsible for it, have cost for a long period more than one billion dollars a year.

The absence from productive occupations of men who have been and who will be killed and maimed will tax the whole world, for the men who fight are the best men—selected stock. This is another item which cannot be estimated—we can only realize that if we could but begin to estimate it we again would find ourselves confronted by unimaginable totals.

If the annual earning power of each of the million men who lost their lives on both sides during our American civil war be estimated at the extremely low figure of \$400, the nation lost by their death \$400,000,000 a year.

The net deficit in earning power, therefore, has been, apparently, more than \$21,500,000,000, but a part of this must be deducted because the forty-nine years would have seen, naturally, the death, disablement, and superannuation of many of these workers. But this sum may be out

# EACH MAN KILLED IN BATTLE COSTS A NATION \$3,677

(Continued from Page 1.)

down far more than half and still more than equal the original cost of the war to the nation.

And this reflection inevitably leads into consideration of the most important phase of the whole subject. This is the social or purely human phase of the cost of war.

The eugenic tragedy of any war is by far its greatest tragedy. That of the present war will be beyond the dreams of theorists. It is especially significant of the superiority of the force of human passion over that of human science that this greatest of all wars, this greatest of eugenic tragedies, should have come to deplete the human stock at the very time when the whole world for the first time has been discussing and acknowledging this comparatively new science.

"In the removal of the noble the ignoble finds its opportunity," is the way David Starr Jordan put the case a few years since.

Accepting as nobility health, intelligence, and the higher impulses, we find the soldier in war time fitly representing the real nobility of his race.

Well, war removes him, and the ignoble—that is, the physically unfit among men, the less intelligent, the lower-minded—find their opportunity. They not only may, but must, become, to a far greater extent than otherwise would be the case, the fathers of the future race.

Brilliant deeds upon the battlefield are done by the man who will take the greatest risks in support of an ideal; the man who will take the greatest risks for an ideal is, ordinarily, the best of men. So these are least likely to escape.

It takes but little thought to roughly reckon, therefore, what must be the eugenic effect of a great conflict.

It has been said that war stimulates the best there is in men. To arouse the best there is in a man does little

for society at large if, immediately after this best is roused, the man is killed.

True, tales of his example may be beneficial to the students of the nation's history, but of the rank and file of those who do their best in warfare no tales ever are told, even though that best be very good indeed. Only the common soldier's most dramatic deeds pass into history.

"Breeding," it is said, "has done most in dogs and least in men."

War, undoubtedly, has been the reason why it has done least in men. For, to again quote Dr. Jordan, "from the man who is left," after the killings of war have ceased, "flows the current of human history."

And even though large numbers of the best of men are left, many are destroyed, and of those remaining many have been deteriorated physically by the effort, by the wounds, by the diseases of wartime; while the economic course of every man participating in a war is interrupted by his service, and, in the majority of cases, such an interruption harms his industrial or professional or mercantile future, thus directly affecting the opportunities that he may offer to the rising generation, which, for a time, depends upon him.

"Send forth the best ye breed"—that, according to Dr. Jordan, was the Roman war call. It surely has been the German war call and the French, and that of the whole modern world.

In Roman times so great was the waste of the fittest through the call of war that, because the best went out to die, their important places in the social fabric were of necessity given to the "sons of stablemen, scullions, slaves, camp followers, and the riff-raff of those whom a great army cannot use."

The fall of Rome, therefore, Dr. Jordan concludes, was not due to luxury, effeminacy, corruption, the weakness of Nero and Caligula, or the weakness of the train of Con-

stantine's worthless descendants. It was due to battle-death among the fittest, so that the unfit became the fathers of the succeeding generation, and, being unfit, produced a different and worthless type of Roman. And they continued Roman life.

The deepest thinkers must agree that the present European war, if long continued, will augur ill for European republicanism. Even should democracy find itself dominant over monarchy at the end of a long and bitterly fought contest, it would find itself confronted by a dearth of that best material among surviving European manhood, upon which government by the people must be founded there if it is to be successful there.

Nor will the disaster of the loss of human merit be less notable even if monarchy continues after the disaster, for no monarch ever made a nation strong or prosperous or wise. Its citizenship must do that.

There are pertinent questions to be asked of war lovers who deny that combat does more harm than good, arguing that it rouses the higher sentiments in men, particularly patriotism, offsetting, thus, its slaughter.

Does that patriotism which essentially is political, that is, which centres around a nation as a whole, its policies, its prowess, its general prosperity, really constitute a valuable national emotion? Is not the more valuable emotion love of the individual home and the general social welfare?

While the leaders in the national patriotism always sing these, incidentally they do not glorify them as they glorify fleets and armies.

The false perspective with which we look at money probably leads us astray at this point, as it does at many. That nation ever has been happiest in which the average man has been most prosperous; isolated millionaires do not build comfort for a people. Even a which led to the

French Revolution proved that most conclusively.

Therefore, the prosperous individual home is what especially counts, and war makes away from that. It impoverishes the many, favoring the few, and encourages future development along these lines by forcing its participants into the habit of obeying orders blindly.

It was the lack of the spirit which accepts discipline—it was sturdy individual independence of all dictation—which built the United States. War tends away from that. Its exponents proclaim this very fact. It disciplines men, making them efficient, they maintain. It does discipline men, making them efficient in machine-like ways; but it kills initiative, which is the tendency toward individual originality.

The admitted deterioration of the French usually is attributed to alcohol and the spreading vice of Paris. But France had been decimated by the Napoleonic wars before it yielded to these evil influences. At least 2,500,000 of the 6,000,000 lives lost in the nineteen years of Napoleonic wars were of the flower of young French manhood, the remaining 3,500,000 having been unequally apportioned among the best that could be furnished by Italy, Germany, Austria, Russia, England, Spain, Turkey, and Arabia. England's indulgence in luxurious vices and its per capita consumption of alcohol are as great or greater than those of France, but these have been far less disastrous to her stamina, because English stock was never ruled by a war lord.

A primitive people suffers less than highly developed peoples suffer from the destructiveness of war. History has often proved this.

A Mexican war which destroyed a third of the Mexican male population would harm Mexico proportionately less than a war which destroyed a third of the European male popula-

tion would harm Europe. Mexican warfare does not inevitably select for its participants the flower of the flock.

When France shoots a German in this war she is killing not only a German soldier, but a certain portion of the incalculable social and educational effort of the ages which has made that individual civilized, able, and industrially effective.

To make this statement is not to sneer at the sanctity of humble life. But it must be admitted that the social loss entailed in the burning of a rich man's mansion, containing priceless works of art, which, if left undestroyed, would have been passed on from generation to generation in the future, is more disastrous to society than the destruction of a workman's cottage, although the workman's cottage might mean more to its owner than the rich man's palace to its proprietor. So with the destruction of developed brains and undeveloped brains.

Thus a decimating war in Mexico, while perhaps surpassing in brutality and horror, must be admitted to be of vastly less importance to the world than a decimating war in Europe, which, being fought according to the modern "humane rules of war," might destroy a far smaller proportion of the contending armies.

So, no matter how incredibly tremendous may be the money losses which this war involves, no matter how depressing may be the records of its stark brutalities, its greatest and its grimmest horror will be in its slaughter of achievement and its destruction of potentiality.

They are not merely buildings but years of progress which are vanishing beneath the smoke arising from the burning towns and cities of the battle zones.

And: "The decline of a people can have but one cause," says Dr. Jordan, "the decline of the type from which it draws its sires."

The type from which all Europe must draw its future sires is now declining with a speed not known before in the world's history, for the present slaughter of good human material is unprecedented.